In truth, the Western World, until our own times, has been content to live in smug ignorance of Asia in general and of the Ottoman colossus in particular in spite of the fact that the Turks historically controlled the land bridge from Iran to China and in modern times controlled Hungary for 150 years, most of the Balkan peninsula until the late nineteenth century and maintained its sovereignty över most of the Arab World until World War I.
During the course of modern history since 1500 A. D., it is clear that the ruling elites of Europe were content to describe the Ottoman Turks to their subjects in the most derogatory terms, for the Ottomans posed not simply a political threat to these elites, but also social, (i. e., religious) and economic threats to muclı of southern and eastern Europe.
1 While the rulers of Europe, whether kings, clergy, academicians or merchants, wished to keep the common people ignorant of the true nature of the Islamic-Ottoman civilization, they personally sought information from every quarter about the origins, the strengths and the weaknesses of the Turkish state.
2 Today a historian concerned vath the nine hundred year span of Turkish prominence in the eastern Mediteırranean, must continually sift through essentially two types of historical literatüre: on the one lıand, those tracts and propogandistic materials which distort or castigate the Turkish imperial system or the Islamic, faith and on the other, serious essays, reports and official documents which reveal the inner workings of an empire spanning history from the thirteenth to the 1;wentieth eenturies. 3 In view of the bias against the study of the Middle East in anything but a Biblical context until recently, ve have only begun to unlock the secrets of those eenturies when the political and financial support of the Ottoman Sultan determined the success or failure of the Protestant Reformation, the longevity on the throne of French and English rulers, the survival of Muscovy or the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealtlı, or the rescue of the Sephardic Jews from Spanisb persecution and murder. 4 One should also not be surprised to learn that the Turks themselves have left many pages of their history either unexplored or only dimly illuminated. Seldom do men of action or affluence have the time, the inclination or the perspective to record details of their exploits for the pleasure and admiration of succeeding generations. Thus, the Ottomans even maintained myths about their origins, which were created by the myth-makers of the expanding and self-conscious empire already in the fifteenth century. Hence, Turkish bistorians of today must often subject to analysis and updating myths which have been a part of Turkish historiography and folklore for up to five centuries.
II
In a commemorative volume dedicated to 900 years of Turkish preeminence in World History, one may perhaps be forgiven for taking another look at the pre-Ottoman and the formative years of the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to clarify for one's self and for one's students and colleagues the essential features of a complex political and social phenomenon which might be termed, "The Origins and Nature of Turkish Power in Western Asia." The task is somewhat more difficult than one might imagine chiefly because scholarship today has become so compartmentalized and specialized that the research findings of Sinologists, Turcologists, Islamic Historians, economists, sociologists and political scientists, some of whom, for example, may be working on the ethnology of the Turks, may not become known to colleagues in neighboring fields for many years. Recently this writer made his first incursion into the treacherous territory of early Ottoman history with an essay entitled, "The Islamic-Ottoman Social Structure: the Quest for a Model of Ottoman History." 5 The purpose of that essay was to cali attention to three basic sources of the Islamic-Ottoman social order: the Platonic political-philosophic tradition as it was incorporated into the writings of the Islamic political philosophers; actual Islamic political practices, and in particular, the survival and renewal of Irano-Islamic political institutions among the Samanid, Ghaznavid and Seljuk states; and finally, the pragmatic and creative abilities of the Ottoman-Turkish leadership as they blended new and old institutions to lay the foundations of a new empire. While scholars have recently directed their attention to the above-mentioned theoretical (i. e. Hellenistic) and traditional (Arab-Iranian Islamic) elements in the Ottoman heritage, the prag-matic and the Turkish ethnological elements have largely remained unreported in Western Languages. In Turkey, by contrast, though sueh efforts were on occasion a bit overzealous, scholars, politicians and publicists, Ziya Gök-alp, Fuat Köprülü, and Kemal Atatürk to mention only the most well-known, sought to bring new information to the field of schclarship about the purely Turkic elements of the Islamic and pre-Islamic past in order to place Turkish nationalism, the ideology of the Republic of Turkey, on a firm footing. Here, it is my own curiosity about the qualities and abilities of the pre-Ottoman Turks-an aspect of the Turkish past which is poorly studied and even less understood-which has led to the writing of this article, and I attempt this survey with one basic assumption: that the Turks possessed more than ordinary skills or else they could not have founded one of the longest surviving empires in history.
III I begin this analysis by stating that for a twentieth century Islamic historian, one of the central questions of Islamic history surely must be: 6 How were the Turks able to conquer and control vast and important territories in the central Islamic lands from the eleventh to the twentieth centuries? Or, to put the question somewhat differently: Why were the Turks, generally speaking, more single-minded and efficient politically than were the other peoples of the Middle East and south eastern Europe?
It is clear that the qualities of leadership so evident among the Turks of the fourteenth century did not accrue in any short period of time. It is thus proposed here to probe briefly the pre-Ottoman qualities and accretions of Turks according to the following rough geographic and chronological sequence:
F. The Dynamics of Early Ottoman State Formation.
A. Economic Neces.sity and the Evolution of Turkish Power on the Chinese Frontier
The Islamic historian, Claude Cahen, 7 has made a preliminary probe into the origins of Turkish adaptabüity and organizational skills and has given much credit to the wide-ranging nature of Turkish steppe nomadism. The implication here appears to be that to move peoples över great distances requires a great deal of organization and efficiency. While not denying this valuable clue which Owen Lattimore has greatly elaborated, 8 I should like here to examine a number of essential features of the 'Turkish system' from the Chinese and Central Asian past of the Turks in order to determine whether such characteristically Turkic features might give to us some new insights about the formative years of the Ottoman State. It is obviously no longer adequate or helpful to state, as so many authors have in the past, that 'the Turkish migrations into the Middle East between the ninth and the thirteenth centuries are the result of obscure political movements on the borders of China.'
Historians today are fully aware that the historiography of a given era tends to reflect the peculiar insights, tastes and needs of that era. I have already mentioned that Fuat Köprülü and Ziya Gökalp among others conducted research into the pre-Islamic past of the Turks. Such an emphasis prompted Köprülü, as a part of his research on early Turkish literatüre 9 to report on the "Influence du Chamanisme Turco-Mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans." 10 As a rather amusing aside, Köprülü noted that ali shamans sported handle-bar mastaches. More recently, Abdülkadir inan has called attention to vestiges of shamanism stili visible among many Anatolian Turks to this day. 11 Clearly the study of the pre-Ottoman history of the Turks has produced important information which bas been poorly reported in Western scholarly literatüre. Doubtless Islamic art historians have done more than any other branch of Islamic scholarship to indicate the important influence of Central Asian and Chinese art forms on craftsmen of the Middle East.
It is quite clear also that even as the Turks and the Mongols brought an eastern caste of mind and rieh cultural gifts to the Middle East, and ultimately to Europe, from the Chinese cultural sphere, the converse is also true. On the basis of the very important studies of such scholars as Lattimore, Eberhard, Köymen, Sümer, Wittfogel, Feng and Hamilton, Islamic historians are in a much better position today than previously to understand the rhythm of invasions from the Eurasian steppe into the Middle East and Eastern Europe in general and the nature of Turkish power in particular. Eberhard in his article, "Die altchinesische Kultur und die Türken," 14 discusses the formation of the first distinctive Chinese culture (Shang-Kultur) between the years 1500 and 1050 B. C., Köymen, in his article, "Der Hsiung-Nu-Stamm der Tu-ku (T'u-ko)," has made a strong case for Tu-ku, i. e., Turkish family and tribal leadership of the Hsiung-Nu federation and has further associated the name, T'u-chüeh (T'yu-Kyu) with a later Chinese transliteration of the most prominent Turkish noble tribe of Tu-ku. 15 To gain the fullest benefit from the ideas of Eberhard, Lattimore and Wittfogel, one must have an elemental knowledge of Chinese and Central Asian geography to wit: the Huang Ho (Yellow) and the Ch'ang Chiang (Yangtze) river basins as the centers of primary Chinese agricultural civilization; the loeation of the steppe and the Gobi desert ot the north, with Outer Mongolia beyond the desert and Manchuria to the northeast of the Yellow River beyond the Great W ali; the loeation of the string of oases reaching into Eastern Turkestan, accessible from China by way of the steppe and desert and which are bordered onfshe north by the Altainand T'ien Shan mountains, on the west by the Pamirs, and the south by the Kun-Lun range. Also one must be aware that nomads had ready access to the western (Eurasian) steppe from Jungaria, between the T'ien-Shan and Altai mountains or from Outer Mongolia. In fact, for the history of Central Asia, the historical atlas of China by Albert Herrmann as revised by Norton Ginsburg is an indispensable tool.
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In the view of Eberhard, the Turko-Mongol steppe peoples, who had distinguished themselves from their more agriculturally oriented neighbors by the eleventh century B. C., imposed their rule över northern China about 1050 B. C.. In the relatively short period of time, during which the northwestern Turko-Mongol (Chou) peoples and the eastern agriculturists, the Tai people intermingled, social and economic characteristics, such as the centrality of the family and the emergence of a feudal gentry, emerged in the resultant Shang society which have been the hallmarks of Chinese civilization ever since. It is to this extent then that the Turko-Mongol peoples can be said to have influenced and served as a catalist for the formation of the primary Chinese society. It is doubtless for this reason also that the careful observer will be struck by many similarities between the Chinese and Turkish family struetures.
17 Eberhard concludes his early discussion of Turco-Mongol contacts with China by denoting the main lines of Turkish culture of that er a: the Turks were primarily breeders of horses but also maintained seasonal plots of grain and other agricultural produce; they worshipped a heavenly god who was represented by the sun; the stars and their movement played a role in their cult as did fire; the Turks possessed a highly developed political system and society was closely stratified. I:a fact, in Eberhard's opinion, it was particularly in the realm of political organizational ability that the early TurkoMongol ruling elite of the Chang period influenced the future course of Chinese development.
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Eberhard clarifies in somewhat greater detail his ideas of the impact of nomadic society on agricultural society in his study, Conquerors and Rulers, Social Forces in Medieval China (Leiden, 1952) . In his opinion, Chinese feudalism developed as a result of nomad incursions. He contends that in China, and elsewhere, feudalism, defined as the assigning of certain rights to an individual över a piece of land in exchange for specific obligations, could only flourish where communications we:re poor and where the basic production was agrarian, with the prevalence of a natural (barter) economy. But,he emphasizes, feudalism is not produced by such conditions per se, but it results from a nomadic conquest of an essentially agrarian society.
19
Lattmore approaches the early frontier history of China in somewhat different fashion. He asks the initial question: When did mutually hostile forms of society emerge? 20 In his opinion, this crucial stage in the development of man in the Chinese culturs.1 sphere came about when the distinction emerged between stall-fed horses which pulled chariots and carts and pasturefed horses whicb were used for travel and food. As pasture-fed horses, because of energy expended in grazing, performed less work, there was a need for many horses and an extensive economic organization to move these horses from pasture to pasture. Lattimore notes also that irrigated agriculture did not become the determinent of differentiation between nomad and farmer until the fourth century B. C.. This observation appears to take issue with the ideas of Wittfogel concerning the central role of irrigation in 'Asian autocratic systems." In an essay on the 'sedentary origins of nomadism,' Lattimore probes even deeper into the origins of the Turks. He contends, rightly it seems, that a steppe oasis favors the domestication of animals and, in fact, without domesticated animals, the steppe is unsafe for humans. Moreover, he reasons, knowledge of castration was essential to the techniques of pastoralisin because vvithout this knowledge it would be inconceivable to control large herds of horses in which the stallions would always be contending for their own herds. In short, Lattimore sees pastoral nomadism as secondary to agriculture and deriving from it. With growing scarcity of land, the agriculturalist is forced to cultivate progressively more marginal land in the direction of the steppe and away from adequate rainfall, irrigation systems, or cheap river transportation. Eventually the marginal farmer finds his flocks or horses a more reliable source of subsistence than his plot of ground, and consequently, he becomes almost completely dependent on grazing and the high mobility which this economy requires. The pastoralist, of necessity, becomes highly skilled in the control of horses. Later, his military prowess was greatly improved by the acquisition of the compound reflex bow and the stirrup, both of which added accurate fire power to the mobility of the horse.
21
Descending from the realm of these provocative theories, it is refreshing to learn from written Chinese sources of actual strategems which these two contending ways of life practiced towards each other. An imperial advisor flourishing in the Han period (206 B. C.-220 A. D.) by the name of Chia I (fi. 200-168 B. C.), indicated in a treatise on the Hsiung-Nu that it should be the aim of Chinese policy to make the Hsiung-Nu upperclass dependent upon Chinese imports.
22 By contrast, a Chinese eunuch serving in the imperial palace (fl. 179-157 B. C.) fled to the Hsiung-Nu court because he harbored grudge against the then reigning Chinese emperor. The eunuch rebuked the Hsiung-Nu (nomadic) ruler for coveting the silks of China and its foodstuffs for, he said, this would have a debilitating effect on the independent power of the nomads. Lattimore cites this story to illustrate his point of view that it was thus not the 'push' of expanding silk production but the 'pull' of transfrontier caravan merchants and middlemen which accounts for the trade in silk to the West. The Chinese thus first became interested in occupying the western oases, sueh as those found in Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang), not primarily to seli silk and other products, but to keep the wealth of the oases out of nomad hands and also to eliminate the possibility of invasion from that quarter. 23 Finally, it is interesting to note that early Han policy concentrated on the objeetive of preventing the defection of leaders in the pay of Chine along the marginal lands of the steppe border. The primary mission of these Chinese 'Wardens of the Marches' was to hold frontier populations within the Chinese orbit. Nomadic chieftains with designs on China naturally attempted to win över the marches either by persuasion of sudden attacks.
24
Apart from the above-noted facts and theories about the origins and way of life of the steppe-dwelling 'horse nomad', both Eberhard and Lattimore give considerable attentionto the mechanisms \vhich propel the steppe dwellers into the settled lands. Obliquely also, both Eberhard and Lattimore make critical remarks about the role of 'hydraulic society' and its relation to 'oriental despotism', a theory discussed in some detail in Kari Wittfogel's book, Oriental Despotism (New Haven, 1957) . The basic criticism of Wittfogel's thesis appears to be that the comp!ex phenomena of any society cannot be reduced to one or two economic considerations such as the task of administering an irrigation system. 25 Eberhard, in delineating his cyclical theory, first of ali makes the broad statement: "We should always keep in mind that differences of race, nationality and language played no role in these nomadic empires." Basic to Eberhard's theory is the deliniation of three main types of nomadic social structure: a. The Tibetan-Here the basic economy is sheep breeding, basically at high altitudes. Consequently, the Tibetans are broken up into small units and wi]l only fight wllıen seriously provoked and then usually as foot soldiers.
b . The Mongolian-The Mongols are basically cattle raisers, depending on the elan, which means they are mobile but slow. Their social organization is much stronger than the Tibetan as the tribes have traditional chiefs, but in contrast to the Turks, there is an essential c . The Turkish-The Turks were basically horse breeders. This factor is reflected in their social structure which is distinguished by the basic inequality of tribes. There was often a traditional 'leader tribe' which supplied leaders for tribal confederations, viz. the Tu-Ku and and the Uighur. There were also ordinary tribes and slave tribes.
Thus, the bases of Turkish political economy developed out of the necessities of a pastoral economy and horse nomadism, which required much more organization than did the grazing of chiefly sheep or cattle. The tasks devolving upon the Turkish leaders were also quite exacting. Some of these tasks included:
i-assigning and protecting summer and winter pastures;
ii-coordinating the movement of the tribe from pasture to pasture in the interests of safety from attack;
iii-as the tribe or tribes often covered great distances, skills in planning, diplomacy and military leadership were essential;
iv-support of the family hierarchical system because the property of each family was of high value and a measure of family status; moreover, as the breeding of horses is a special skill and their reproduction relatively slow, family activities must also be carefully planned and controlled;
v-Seasonal agriculture at a given grazing ground was probably in the hands of the women.
26
To grasp how intimately Turkish nomadism and even Turkish politics of a bygone era were connected with the horse, one would do well to consult the article, "The Cult of the Horse in the Turkish Onomastique," by A. Caferoğlu. Often the color or the breed of a horse was connected with one particular tribe or with the order of battle of an army. It is interesting to note also that the Turkish word il which translates roughly as 'realm, province' was explained thus by the great Turkish lexicographer of the eleventh century, Mahmud al-Kashgari: "The word il is a term which applies to the horse; horses are the wings of the Turks. The trainer (or groom) who eares for the horses is called il başi which means (by extension) the head of a province. The reason for this usage is that whoever trains the horses is indispensable (to the tribe)."
27
As we have here touched upon the Iexicographic evidence for the importance of earlier institutious, it is also interesting to note that the word for 'horse or camel trainer (söyis)' in Arabio derives from the same root as does siyasa, the Arabic word for 'management, rule, government, politics,' thus originally the 'managing of horses or camel.'s."
28

B. Why Did the Nomads Invade the Agriculturally-Based
Empires?
Having discussed the importar.ee of the horse, his training and the premium plaeed on mobility among 'horse nomads' in order to graze the herds, we are now in a position to elaborate Eberhard's eyclieal theory of conquest and the aeculturation or re-conquest taking place between the nomads and the agriculturalists in the Chinese cultural sphere. To initiate his eyele, Eberhard envisages the nomad elans as living in loose connection with each other on the steppe near the deliniated borders of China. Through a system of market exchange, pastoral produets are amicably traded for agricultural and handerafted goods. But as the rate of exchange shifts against the nomad (and the mechanism of this key shift is not explained), 29 the nomad gradually begins to seize by raiding what he cannot obtain by market exchange. Now the agriculturist neighbors of the nomads take defensive precautions against the nomads and the elans, in turn, (perhaps feeling the lack of certain essential items of exchange-weapons or food-or commercial items) ünite under a capable and daring leader. If the nomad armies are successful, they abandon their marginal agriculture altogether and take their foodstuffs from the farmers at will. Now open warfare develops between the Chinese state defending the farmers and the nomadic confederation. Eventually the federation either wins över the agricultural-based empire or is defeated by it. In either case, Eberhard feels that the nomad empire is doomed to ultimate failure because of eitber the struggle for power among competing tribal leaders if victorious or the struggle for subsistence if thrown back into the steppe upon defeat. Thence the cycle begins again.
In the opinion of this writer, the Eberhard theory has one majör flaw. The blame always appears to be placed on the nomad for disturbing the peace. Actually, however, the original market imbalance is the starting point and could be 'caused' by either type of producer and might well originate from an increase in population or immigration on either the steppe or the farms. The nomads, with more mouths to feed, would tend to encroach on marginal farmland for additional pasturage' conversely ,the farmers, faced w itli an increase in population, would plow up more of the steppe fringes than previously or 'charge' more for their produce, thus impinging on nomad pastures or increasing 'costs' for the nomads. Hence we have here an ancient version of the feuds between the cattlemen and the farmers in the American West. attachment to the city, understandably upset this arrangement. 32 This system of placing tribal leaders on the roles of the gentry brings to mind the Byzantine and Muscovite Russian practiees vis-â-vis invading pastoral peoples.
The Sha-y'o (<-/ Sart), who were closely assoeiated with the 'Five Dynasties' (907-960 A. D.) exhibited as a ruling class the typical eharacteristics of the nomadic Turks. They worshipped the heavenly god (T'ien-Shen), sacrificed horses on sacred mountains, distributed the Chinese state trasury to their followers as if it were booty, and practieed a system of adoption of neighboring tribes into their ranks. They issued the so-called'iron bulls' (<~Mon-gol paizah), the bearer of which could neither be punished, deposed nor taxed. Eberhard, probably correetly, relates this bull or decree to the ancient Turkish practice of issuing a tarhanlik (> tarhan = blacksmith, perhaps deriving from the nomadic respect for the ancient forger of weapons). We learn also that the Sha-t'o used singing (i. e., hollowed out) arrows as military signals, sent messages in 'wax letters,' probably a kind of yarlik sealed with wax, posted victory flags (lou-pu), loved to participate in earlier forms of football, polo, -wrestling and played martial music.
33
Referring obliquely to the T'yu Kyu (confederation (fl. 500-840 A. D.), who maintained control of the inner Asian trade routes for several centuries, Eberhard, drawing particularly upon the work of Annemarie von Gabain, notes the tendency of tribal leaders to become ever more interested in investment and the accumulation of wealth by controling the inner Asian oases and the east-west trade routes. In particular, it was the Uighurs and their Sogdian relatives who excelled in oasis and caravan management.
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Owen Lattimore, in an essay on 'The Geographic Factor in Mongol History,'
35 first presented in 1936, dealt with the problem of how nomadic incursions are generated by refuting Toynbee's theories of nomads being "pushed off" the steppe by climatic change (aridity) or "pulled off" the steppe by the breakdown of sedentary civilizations. The author's main point was that such a view was understandable for some:one who viewed nomads as living a simple pastoral existence, but in. actual fact the rhythm of life for the nomads of Inner Asia was complex and could not be described apart from the forests, deserts, oases, and agricultural eommunities on the periphery of the Eurasian steppe. On the steppe there was an unending struggle for balance and adjustment between differing eeonomic interests, social groups, and political complications. And in times of majör conquests, the rate of social change in the fringe areas between the steppe and the other geographic regions accelerated.
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In every case of social change, these transitional zones between the desert and the sown played a decisive role. But one does not find a straight line of evolution from the patriarchal elan society of the steppe to a transitional stage of feudalism in a conquered territory, and finally, to an imperial centralized system. Lattimore prefers to consider the alternate periods of concentration and dispersion among the nomads as proceeding in spiral fashion, implying that each new era of concentration brought with it some improvement över the previous such period. 37 But in spite of this spiral and the variety of the competing economies around the steppe periphery, Lattimore reminds us that the dominent landscape was that of pastoral steppe where, in the absence of modern industry, no social organization was possible except pastoral nomadism. And wbile nomads often became a part of the societies on the steppe periphery, new recruits also continually took up the steppe economy, leaving behind the Siberian forests or marginal agricultural tracts, for the steppe economy was capable of becoming entirely self-sufficient. Thus, the most important agent in Lattimore's analysis is the nomadic chief who has the option to build contacts with the periphery or to ignore it. It was the marginal areas, however, that permitted or favored change and hence... "prevented history from stagnating." In short, the marginal areas controlled the impulses for dispersion and concentration. As an example, Lattimore reminds us that Jenghiz Khan, like his father, held a title as 'lord of the marehes' for the Chin or Juchen Dynastry which the Mongol Empire replaced.
A factor of paramount importance also in the cultural ferment on the steppe in the view of Lattimore was the fact that steppe nomadism, though highly specialized in the rearing of horses, also demanded k certain versatility, independence, and initiative in the individual which provided a sound prepa- ration in the event of rapid change. As a test case of his multi-trained steppe nomad, Lattimore points to the example of the Orkhon Turks of the eighth century who, on the one hand, practiced or patronized irrigated farming in Outer Mongolia and also grew wealthy by controlling and investing in longdistance commerce such as transporting sable and squirrel pelts from the Siberian forests to the Chinese cities. Finally, Lattimore reminds us that 'horse nomads' could convert to military mobility without any increase in costs' and few changes in their way of life. For the agriculturally-based society, not only did the costs of conversion to a war economy come high, the damage the nomads could easily inflict on the settled populations and irrigation systems could destroy agriculture altogether and hence the main economy of a state. The converse was not true; the nomad ofteıı had nothing to lose but a tent made out of hides and a few sheeps.
In an essay on 'Frontier Feudalism' 38 in 1954, Lattimore clarified his view of the rhythm of conquest of the nomads. Building upon his earlier observations that a hypothetical 'pure nomadism', though nonexistent, would be completely independent from the diversified fringe of the steppe, he places the ultimate volition to attack or not to attack in the hands of the tribal leader. Rather than rely on a rigid division of nomadism into Tibetan, Mongol or Turkish types as does Eberhard-Lattimore notes that Eberhard failed to mention the forest nomads and also to show that there were Turkish tribes in ali three categories-Lattimore considers that the steppe federations varied in the percentage of sheep, horses, yaks, camels ete. they tended depending on the region and the historical situation. Although to my knowledge he nowhere struetures his system of concentration, invasion of settled civilization and later dispersion, Lattimore would perhaps see the mechanism thus: a . A leader of an almost purely nomadic group, on the basis of Lattimore's maxim' a pure nomad is a poor nomad is a hungry and daring nomad', inereases the size of his ulus by victories över neighboring tribes whether nomadic or oasis-oriented;
b . The size of the troop of armed and mounted warriors at his command convince the' lords of the marehes' serving China that their best interests will be served by switching sides; c . When the border buffer areas go över to the nomads and the erops are trampled under the hooves of the horsemen, the settled society quickly capitulates;
d . Thereafter, the nomadic leader converts his tribal control into military control över the agricultural state in three stages:
i. placing garrisons at strategic locations deep within Chinese territory but ruling the state and collecting taxes basically with the aid of the Chinese 'gentry';
ii. Clan leaders are settled on the borders with their followers who are supposed to continue the pastoral life while the chiefs are given Chinese border fiefs to augment their incomes;
iii. Deeper in the steppe and near to the oases, the khan maintains more distantly related and associated tribes, keeping their leaders within his orbit of power by rich gifts and the assignment of lucrative trade privileges and fiefs in the oases;
e . This process was reversed whenever upstart sub-chiefs or peasant revolts begin to dismantle the system. Eventually the tables are completely turned with the following result:
i. Former garrison troops and courtiers may withdraw, be slaughtered, or become integrated by marriage or service into the ranks of the gentry;
ii. Nomadic chieftains possessing border fiefs may serve the new Chinese regime as march lords or else withdraw;
iii. The distant elans may hold on to their gains deep in the steppe, give them up to the retreating khan as a refuge or become once again greatly dispersed.
With some embellishments here and there, we have essentially Lattimore's two complementary forms of 'frontier feudalism'. In the first type, the nomadic confederation gains the upper hand; in the second type, the Chinese reassert themselves but never abandon completely the nomadic component of their state in the border zone. 39 Clearly then, in the view of those Sinologists such as Lattimore, Eberhard and Köymen, who have concerned themselves with the steppe and fron-tier areas within the orbit of Chinese civilization, the Turkic peoples had experienced almost 2000 years of intimate contact with China and the oases of Central Asia prior to the movemer.t of the Seljuks into the central lands of islam. At the center of Turkish nomadic life was horse breeding and the pastoral economy, but the environment of the steppe offered wide experience additionally in many types of agriculture and commerce. In particular, certain clans providing leadership for the periodic formation of large tribal confederations were greatly skilled in diplomacy, coordination of economic life and in military leadership. Finally, we have reviewed and discussed two complementary theories about the process by which a pastoral nomadic confederation transforms itself into a powerful empire basing itself partly on the eases of Central Asia and partly on the irrigated farmlands of Northern China.
C. Who Were the Oghuz and What Pressures Drove Them Westward?
On the basis of conclusions arrived at by James Hamilton after the careful sifting of Chinese, Eastern Turkic and Byzantine sources, 40 scholars now are in a better position than previously to understand who the Oghuz Turks were prior to their appearance in Islamic sources. Furthermore, the Islamic sources have recently been closely scrutinized by such scholars as Sümer, Köymen, Bosworth, Kafesoğlu and Turan. This spurt of activity among Turkologists and Sinologists has added a great deal of new and specific information about the mechanisms of Turkic migrations into Western Asia and into the Müslim heartlands,
In the fifth century source materials attest to the grouping together of "Ten Uighur" clans which belonged to that group of tribes which the Chinese designated by the term T'ie-lo (> Tagrag; mod. Turk., Tekerlek, i. e., the peoples possessing large-wheeled wagons). The term Uighur itself probably, as in the case of the Tu-ku mentioned above, was the name of the largest orleading elan of the particular confederation and hence, as was the practice on the steppe, it gave its name to the entire confederation. Further than this, however, Hamilton considers, on the basis of good linguistic evidence, that the term 'Uighur' derives from an older Turkish expression Oghush signifying 'ally' or 'elan' which may also take another variant in the seventh century of 'Oghuz' (Thus, Oghul > Uighur > Oghuz). As a result of political struggles in the fifth and sixth centuries during the formation of the T'yu-Kyu empire, some clans of the 'Ten Allies' (On Uighur) moved westward from Mon-golia to the steppelands between the Aral Sea and the Northern Caucasus and contributed in the sixth and seventh centuries to the formation of the medieval Turkic states of the Khazars and the Bulgars. 41 The memory of the "Ten Uighur" Iingered on and appeared in the Turkic inscriptions on the Orkhon river (mid-8th century), in Rashid ed-Din's chronicle (early 14th century) and elsewhere. The official chronicle of the Chinese Souei Dynasty (581-617 A. D.)record that the T'ie-lo tribes stili remaining in Outer Mongolia were attacked by the T'yu-Kyu confederation at the beginning of the seventh century, their wealth confiscated and their leaders killed. This repression sparked a revolt against the T'yu-Kyu by the T'ie-lo peoples in the Altai region.
The eastern T'yu-Kyu confederation, under a combined attack of a Chinese and Uighur force about the year 630 A. D., broke up and thereafter, under the leadership of the Uighurs ( a remnant of the former 'Ten Uighur ?), a new grouping of tribes known as the "Nine Oghuz" assumed control of Outer Mongolia.
42 By the mid eighth century, according to the Orkhon inscription celebrating the reign of the Uighur Qaghan Bilga (747-759 A. D.), the Nine Clans, i .e., the Dokuz Oghuz, had put an end to the rule fo the T'yuKyu entirely. 43 In the opinion of Bosworth, the Dokuz Oghuz, having thus lost one majör reason for their cohesion, began ot lose it as they incorporated defeated peoples into their federation while moving westward. After their decisive defeat by the Kirghiz in 840, the Dokuz Oghuz, in any case, were forced to leave Outer Mongolia whence they, under the leadership of the Uighur elan, occupied the oases north and south of the Tien Shan, that is, Western and 'Chinese' Turkestan. 44 Other clans of this Oghus confederation, now occupied the region between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, a region which had already been occupied, according to Müslim sources, by Turkish tribes of the T'ie-lo (Western T'yu-Kyu?) confederation earlier.
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To recapitulate, the Oghuz Turks, to whom the Seljuk and the Osmanli Turks trace their origin, had served in the T'yu-Kyu Empire of the sixth and seventh centuries and again in the Uighur Confederation known as the Dokuz Oghuz up to the middle of the ninth century. Thereafter, the leading tribe of the Dokuz Oghuz, which actually went by the name 'Uighur', occupied and Turkified the oases of Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang), eventually becoming subjects of the Kara Khitay in the twelfth century and of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The remaining tribes of the Dokuz Oghuz spread över Central Asia and the steppe from the Yolga and the Caspian to the Oxus. The region between the Oxus and the Caspian served as the future starting point for the Seljuk infiltration and invasion of the central Islamic lands.
Meanwhile, at the time of the breakup of the Uighur power, and contributing to it, the Ch'i-tan (Kitay, lıence Cathay in Western sources), aMongol people who had dwelt in southera Manchuria and who had served the T'yuKyu and Uighur rulers from the 6th to the 9th centuries, began to form a powerful new confederation. By the beginning of the tenth century, the Ch'-itan had established their clear hegemony över northern China, Mongolia, Manchuria and the adjacent steppe and thus founded the Liao Dynasty (907-1125 A. D.). 46 The Ch'i-tan rulers, in accordance with traditional practice, forced the reorganization of captive tribes under their control, placed Ch'i-tan leaders the new tribal units and assigned various tribesmen to guard units in the ordo, the seat of the Kağan. 47 If we study the movement of the Dokuz
Oghuz westward with the knowledge that a strong centralized Mongol power, the Liao, had taken possession of the traditional eastem grazing grounds of the Oghuz, we shall have a clearer understanding of the pressure upon the Oghuz to seek pasturage and security in the Islamic lands. Doubtless wishing to escape the destruction of their traditional tribal units and to avoid the onus of serving under their former Mongol vassals, the remnants of the Dokuz Oghuz had pushed out of the Orkhon basin. In Transoxiana, the Oghuz fought with and displaced the Pechenegs who later appear on the Ukrainian steppe to harass the Kievan Rus. Before leaving the traditional 'Far Eastern' steppe environment of the Turks, it is important to glean some political details from the Liao (Kitay), who were contemporaneous with the Seljuks, in order to clarify the later political activities of the Oghuz and the Jenghizid Mongols. Today it is customary to look to the West for political and military innovation, but in medieval times, innovation often came from the east. Contrary of the generally accepted theory that the nomadic or semi-nomadic conquerors of China (e. g., the Ch'i-tan, Jurchen, Yüan (Mongol), ete.) were readily absorbed by the Chinese, Wittfogel and Feng have sought to demonstrate, in their important study of Liao Society, that the process of acculturation between steppe nomads and settled agriculturists or townsmen was quite slow and complex. Looking closely at the Liao-Ch'i-tan Society, they have shown that: j . Finally, by reference to the Liao law code of T'ai-tsu (907-947), founder of the dynasty, we may discern legal principles which doubtless express tribal customs formulated on the steppe many centuries previously. Thus, for example, a person who insulted a superior or disobeyed his parents was threatened with death by torture, a law thus reflecting a strict hierarchical mode of life typical of Turkic peoples from that time until the recent Korean War (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) .
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This brief excursus into Liao political history may serve as an indication of the state of political and military development of the Turks on the eve of the Seljuk invasion of the Islamic heartlands.
D. How Was Economic and Political Power Reinforced Culturally ?
Another important aspect of the pre-Islamic background of the Turks also deserves some mention here: notably their religious and ethical background. To discuss the conversion of the Turks to islam without some understanding of the prior ethical state of the steppe dweller would be most inadequate for our purposes here, for it is the ethical underpinnings which make this examination of'the nature of Turkish power' more intelligible. Thanks to the studies of Lattimore, Eberhard and others we have dealt in considerable depth with economic reasons and importance of maintaining a hierarchical and disciplined life on the steppe. Here we shall now seek out the ethical and cultural aspects of that life which serve to re-inforce the political and economic patterns and necessities.
At the heart of the Turkish ethical system lay shamanism. In fact, even after the conversion of the Turks to islam a number of shamanistic practices continued to play a part in the life of the Turks. The shaman of a elan or tribe was usually a native of that tribe. He was generally seleeted by the senior shaman from among those local boys who showed themselves to be contemplative, intelligent and withdrawn. The elder shamans would then teach him their art and the novice in turn could add his own embellishments and variations as he matured. The shaman performed the essential role of communicating directly with the gods above and the evil spirits below. He gave to his tribal members what has been termed 'psychic integrity' the assurance that a member of their own tribe could intercede for them in critical circumstances produced by inhabitants of the unseen world. Thus, in matters of birth, death, marriage, warfare and tragedy, the shaman was called upon to speak a good word.
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The basic ritual of the shaman often began with the staging of some 'miracle', such as walking on hot coals or the use of ventriloquism. This stage was followed by an ecstatic experience wherein the shaman might fail to the floor or the earth, face downward, in a trance. The third phase was not visible to mere mortals as it entailed the ascent of the shaman to heaven or his descent to hell to intercede for his tribesmen. Sometimes the shaman became 'possessed' by spirits and his body writhed in pain. Upon coming out of his trance, the shaman might relate to his audience the series of incidents which befell him on his journey. Often a superb horse was symbolized as the means by which the shaman was transported to heaven. Among the Turks, the drum in particular, but other musical instruments and singing on occasion, served as a 'celestial bridge' to prepare the way for an ethereal flight or communion with the spirits. In the other world everything was opposite to its counterpart on earth; also, the recently deceased were greatly feared while the ancestors were revered and accessible by means of the shaman. The bow and arrow too served as symbols of celestial flight.
Perhaps most important in terms of the Turkic authority structure, every head of a family was recognized as the head of the domestic cult and hence maintained custodianship över the family drums. The implication here is fundamental: the family patriarclı could communicate with the spirits to reinforce family discipline and his authority. Symbolically the weapons of the warriors served as a defense a.gainst evil spirits in the struggle for life, health, fertility and the world of'light' against death, disease, sterility, disaster and 'darkness.' Thus shamanism, to the extent that it presented the world as the place of struggle between heroes and demons, became closely related to the development of epic literatüre among the steppe nomads.
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As the art of the shaman depended greatly upon the personality, intelligence and personal magnetism of the individual shaman, it is not surprising that the influence of the shaman fluctuated with time and place. A divergence in lore or ritual or an adverse message from the spirits through direct contact or devination could bring about radical changes in a given tribe. As to the difference between shamanism and a revealed religion, Wach reminds us: "The essential difference between religion and magic is the fact that the former recognizes the subjection of man to the supernatural which he worships, while the magician tries to impose his will upon the gods by means of conjuration. Magic, that is, shamanism, required an intercessor; religion, a prophet". (Cf. also synonyms and related terms in Turkish: büyücü, üfürükçü, falci, okuyucu, cadu, afsuncu, irkil, kam (archaic term for shaman).
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The Chadwicks in their classic study of the origins of literatüre devoted a section of their work to the 'Oral Literatüre of the Tatars'. 54 The themes of the heroic poetry include raiding, theft of herds, single combats, revenge of iajuries, wooings and marriages, the birth and remarkable childhood of heroes, sports and long adventure-filled journeys, typical events in the life of the steppe. The primary virtues extoled are courage, loyalty and generosity and of prowess against enemies. The personnel of the poems are generally aristocratic and the women often prove to be as heroic and militant as the men and sometimes more savage. Feasting on a grand scale demonstrates the generosity and success of a hero or ruler. Often the hero appears as a law unto himself as long as his exploits bring victory and booty, yet the hero, in spite of a certain coarseness, exhibits an air of decorum and self control. The journey of the hero through strange lands and his struggle against evil spirits are reminiscent of the flights of the shaman to lıeaven or the underworld. Behind the desperate and hopeless undertakings of some heroes lies the relentless will to survive in the often harsh and unpredictable economic conditionş of steppe life.
Here again we are reminded of Lattimore's platitude: 'a pure nomad is a poor nomad, is a hungry and daring nomad.' Among Ashan interesting part of the non-heroic literatüre of the steppe, we find that riddles play an important role. Two heroes seeking the hand of a fair maiden may be given riddles by the prospective father-in-law as a test of their intelligence or reasoning powers. Finally, in ali of the literatüre of the steppe peoples the horse figures prominently to the point of speaking to the hero and sharing in his heroic deeds.
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Once again we are led to conclude that, as with shamanism, the oral literatüre served to reinforce tribal lotalties, virtues and discipline. To translate this cultural influence into practical affairs of political significance requires the examination of two institutions: the Mongol concept of nukur or 'declaring one's self a follower' and the Turkic term bahadir (bagatur) or 'knight, follower, hero'. According to Lattimore, the Mongols built larger units after the defeat of other tribes by applying three different methods, each of which, in its own way, helped the defeated tribe to save face: 56 i. By extending blood kinsbip on the basis of anda or 'sworn brotherhood' which required the acknowledgement of the ancestors of the conquering tribe;
ii. By 'collective subjection' (unagan bogol) to the conquering tribe, a practice which permitted the subject tribe to keep its elans intact and to hold property;
iii. Finally, by permitting young warriors of a defeated tribe to 'deelare themselves a follower (rau/cur)' of the new leader.
This latter method of changing allegiance was the most drastic and disruptive of previous elan struetures because to become a nukur, one must break with his former tribal ties and submit to the will of the new chieftain. In this manner, the instilling of heroism in the young men had a natural outlet when the young warrior could join an elite corps of a newly-forming steppe confederation.
The Turkish equivalent of the nukur practice appears to have been the position of the bahadiror alp (Cf. other Turkish synonyms such as kahraman, yiğit, cengâver). While according to Köprülü, 57 the institutional history of bahadir has not yet been worked out fully, we are aware of the concept of an elite guard serving the various khans and kagans of the steppe empires as far back as T'yu-Kyu times. Moreover, the members of the elite 1000 man guard unit set up by Jenghiz. Khan were called bahadir. This term also crept into the titles of the rulers who were under Mongol or Eastern Turkic influence, but was only rarely used among the fierly Ottomans. Nevertheless, the presence and the efficacy of such an elite guard institution and of its fundamental association with the basic political and ethical mores of the steppe peoples, regardless of the terms used to diseribe it, was not lost to the Ottomans!. While touching here upon the longevity of such an institution as an elite guard unit on the steppe and in the Chinese orbit, it would also seem appropriate to note the continuity of Turkic steppe titles among the Seljuks and Ottomans. Köp-rülü's excellent summary of the widespread use of the title 'Bey' indicates in another direetion the impact of the s teppe on Islamic society from the eleventh century on.
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Before turning to the conversion of the Turks to islam, one should give passing recognition to one other important literary work of the Turkish past, notably the Kudatku Bilig (The Knowledge Befitting a Ruler) a practical guide to ruling a kingdom written in Uighur by a chambarlain (hajib) at the court of Bughra Khan. In studying the literatüre of the Uighurs we are reminded of the crossroads nature of Eastern Turkestan where Manishaean, Nestorian Christian, and Buddhist communities long withstood the political and cultural pressure of islam.
59 By tlıe late tenth century, however, Lattimore concedes that islam is beginning to dominate the 'oasis world' of Central Asia. In fact, he calls the Muslims the 'Protestants' of the oases as they were much more political-minded than, for example, the Buddhists.
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The Kudatku Bilig as en eleventh century Turkish political tract serves as a measure of the sophistication of the Turkish oasis leadership and as an indication of the extent of Islamization in Turkestan. The writer divides the Uighur society of Kashgar into three groups: the simple people (kara artı); the servitors (tapukci) and government officials. The kara am consisted of merchants (satikci), peasants (taranci) and animal breeders (igdişçi). In the tapukci class were the seyyids Ç alevi), the physicians (öteci), conjurers (apsunci) and astrologers (müneccim). )The government officials were comprised of the khan, the wazirs, the army leaders (su başi), the scribes (bitikci), the ambassadors (yol agasi ? ?, Cf. with Ulağ) and the guards (kapukci).
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The conflict between the old shamanist ways and the new Müslim science is illustrated in the Kudatku Bilig when the ruler is advides to respect the physician because he heals with medicine, but also, to honor the shaman who heals with a talisman.
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E. The Seljuk Conversion to islam and Some Questions of Turkish Pouıer in Western Asia
As the westward probing Oghuz entered the Islamic environment of Transoxiana in the latter half of the tenth century, they appeared to be well led and unified. They are known to have displaced the Pechenegs, driving them to the northern shores of the Black Sea. Evidence also points to elements of the Oghuz having raided the Khazar state, possibly leagued with the Ki-evan Rus, about 985. 63 They also had sharp encounters with the Karluk tribe.
It is not elear whether or not the Oghuz remained under the leadership of one Yabgu (leader of a confederation) up to the early years of the eleventh century. 64 What seems clear is that there was much strife among the leading families and their followers över the supreme leadership of the tribal confederation. Although, as has been emphasized above, certain families among the Turks always provided tribal leadership, controversy often developed över whom should succeed a given luler. Was he to be succeeded by his own offspring only, could brothers and sisters of the leader lay claim to the supreme headship for themselves or their children? The succeeding history of the Turks was bedeviled vith this question. The Seljuks accepted the broader family principal; the Ottomans, doubtless because of events in their early history to be touched upon at the end of this paper, evolved a system of executing members of rival, parallel lines. Professor Bernard Lewis, in an important paper which anticipates some of the points in this essay, has discussed the important problem of dynastic suceession among the Turks. know that the Oghuz Turks under Seljuk family leadership accepted islam of the Sünni persuasion and were henceforth referred to as Türkmen or Turcoman, thus distinguishing them from those Turks who remained loyal to shamanist beliefs. The Seljuks very early gained aceeptance among their Müslim neighbors beeause of their prowess as fighters. They helped successively the Müslim Karakhanids, the Samanids, the Ghaznavids and the Khwarezmshahs against their noıı-Muslimı neighbors such as the the tribes previously mentioned and also the formidable Kitay. Nor did the Seljuks neglect their relations with the Caliphate in Baghdad whicb at the time was stili controlled by the Buwayhids, those warriors from Dailam who followed the Twelver Shi'ite persuasion. 66 It was indeed the relationship which the early Seljuks developed with the Caliph al-Qa'im and his sueeessors which lent a certain legitimacy to the conquests of the Turks even though these relationships were seldom free of bitterness and rivalry. In particular, the defeat by the Seljuks of the Buwayhids and other smaller dynasties made possible the resurgence of traditional islam in the last decades of the eleventh century.
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Without here going into a detailed description of the Seljuk takeover of the Near East in the eleventh century, a task which has recently been so well done by a number of scholars, 68 it is important nevertheless to cali attention to the far-reaching changes in the Islamic Near East during the eleventh century and thereafter as a result of its penetration by the steppe peoples. As had repeatedly in the past, a povverful steppe confederation, this time the Dokuz Oghuz, had lost its inner cohesion, but one branch thereof, which was subject to the leadership of the Seljukids, accepted islam, initially ingratiated themselves with their Müslim neighbors on the borders of Khorasan, and eventually, applying the time -honored tactics of the steppe, carved out an empire often with the encouragement of what we might term today the Sünni Müs-lim establishment. We have so far ealled attention to three majör events of the eleventh century: the movement of the Seljuks into the central lands of islam, the Islamization of a large block of Turks, and the rapid conquests and the legitimization of the Seljuk rule. Perhaps of decisive importance, however, for the first time large areas of the Near East and adjacent regions became Turkified. Apart from Eastern Turkestan, settled by the Uighurs, we know that the following regions absorbed large Turkish populations: Khwarezmia, east of the Caspian; the Kipchak (modern Ukrainian) steppe; Azerbaijan; many districts within the confines of Iran; certain regions of the Caucasus; Northern Iraq and, after the Battle of Manzikert, much of Asia Minör. Clearly there was also more than one wave of Oghus: Turks to swell the ranks of the initially penetrating Seljukids. Köprülü gives credit chiefly to a population explosion as an explanation of this glut of steppe dwellers. 70 While not denying this out of hand, in the view of this wri ter, the nomadic way of life itself and the basic nutritional value of pastoral foods gave to the invaders a much higher rate of natural increase and subsequently a higher natural rate of survival than the diet of the average town dweller of the Müslim Middle Ages. There is no doubt whatsoever that the plague ('bad air') and other mass epidemic killers affected the nomads much less than it did the town dwellers, a fact we know from eyewitness accounts of the Ottoman invasion of Eastern Thrace about 1354. In the Near East today, we have positive proof of the efficacy of the pastoral diet which was widely accepted throughout the area, influencing also Eastern Europe with the coming of the Ottomans and Western Europe and North America today. This new range of steppe cuisine in the Near East probably dates from the eleventh century, but whatever was not adopted then, came in with the second majör wave of Turks just before, during and after the Mongol conquests in the thirteenth century.
In this essay, we have now come full circle, starting with the 900th anniversary of Manzikert, we have sought answers to the questions Vhence and who are the Turks ?' by seeking wisdom 'even in China.' Ve asked the rhetorical but basic question: How were the Turks able to conquer and control vast and important territories in the central lands of islam from 1071 until the beginning of this century ? If we look at the Turkish social structure even today, we can come up with a partial answer. The Turks have maintained, by and large, a hierarchical system of authority, based on special skills and nurtured in a patriarchal family system, for thousands of years. Moreover, the old Turkish elite, partly because of this authoritarian system, partly because they allowed for mobility in the system, and partly because the old Turkish families possessed at first herds and flocks and finally large estates, these family responsibilities provided the opportunity for energetic scions of a given family to become experienced leaders and managers of their own family holdings. It was thereafter only a small step to become headers of warriors and whole countries. But must we indeed turn to the pre-Islamic history of the Turks to understand Seljuk and Ottoman history? It is the opinion of this writer that we must.
For many years, Islamic scholars have attempted to answer most questions of Turkish history by seeking answers almost exelusively within an Islamic Arab or Persian context. This Islamic approach may have been dictated by a certain bias of Western European and American historians to view most aspects of nomadism or the steppe environment as at once too barbaric and unintelligible. Turkish historianas before the formation of the Turkish Republic were also stıongly influenced by this bias. Let me hasten to say, that it is of course essential to understand the Islamic environment in which the Seljuks and the Osmanli thrived. But in matters of large scale political organization and in the management of a complex economy, the Turks had no real peers in the Middle East once they had broken the power of the Italian city states. This sweeping statement does not deny indeed that the 'Turkish system' deserves its share of careful criticism as do ali political systems. This point of view also would not deny that many brilliant discoveries have been made during the past century of Islamic scholarship. Sometimes the greatest gems of scholarship are not widely circulated. One suc hitem is Professor Cahen's study of the adverse effect on Islamic political institutions produced by illiterate Turkish generals siezing power from the Abbasid Caliphs in ninth century Baghdad. 70 In the Seljuk and the Ottoman states, for example ,as
Wittek has often pointed out, there was always a state of tension between tribal elements and the purveyors of the traditional agricultural and cityoriented high islam. The history of Bashid ed-Din doubtless best portrays the tension between pasture-hungry Mongol troops and the traditional villagers To test whether or not inner Asian history supplies answers to some of the baffling questions of Turkish history, let us turn to some of the specific problems:
1 . It is clear that the Turkie steppe nomad, in terms of mobility, fire power and invulnerability to attack, had a tremendous advantage över his agriculturist opponent; mobility iıı fact was the key to successful grazing of animals for the nomad. The nomad could render long-term damage to agricultural production in a very short time. The Seljuk, Mongol and Ottoman leadership was always aware of this potential. Tughril Bey, in his negotiations with the dignitaries of Nishapur, reminded them of their vulnerability, a point which hastened the capitulation of the city. The failure of the armies of Mas'ud of Ghazna to relieve Nishapur owiııg to their heavy baggage train and the difficulty of crossing the desert and steppe gives us a classic example of the advantages of even a relatively small and impoverished Turkie tıibe över skilled conventional armies of the eleventh century Iranian frontier region. The Mongols, exercising far less restraint than did the Seljuks, laid waste a number of agriculturally advanced regions of Persia, obliterating the population and grossly reducing their revenues. The Ottomans during the early centuries of their existence were on both the giving and receiving end of 'scorched earth' policies. They did not hesitate to lay waste the lands of a recalcitrant enemy and carry his inhabitants off into slaveı y with the help of skirmishers (başi bozuk), Crimean Tatars and similar elements. But they also strictly forbade the molestation of peasant holdings within their own realm. and towns on the steppe periphery. One may even some day make a special case for the Oghuz as a tribal confederation receiving special tutelage in the ways of the oases from the Uighurs who controlled the agriculture and commerce of Turkestan.
3 . We must lean heavily on the work of the above-noted Sinologists and ethnologists for an understanding of the functioning of Turkic elites. Clearly even the Turkic tribes maintained hierarchical relationships among themselves. Hence, 'noble' tribes exhibit a concentration of leadership skills which are necessary for the survival of large confederation such as the T'yu-Kyu, the Uighur or the Oghuz. Moreover, a lead tribe generally gave its name to an entire confederation thus acconuting for the subordination or disappearance of other tribal names. Lattimore's detailed description of the tremendous flexibility and adaptability of the steppe nomad in a rapidly changing social environment also corresponds favorably to our knowledge of the early Ottomans.
4 . The conversion of the Seljukids to islam has not been adequately explained. We have tried to show here that the economic necessities of horse nomadism provided a raison d'etre for a strict hierarchical and patriarchal type of life on the steppe. It is also clear that shamanism reinforced the discipline of the tribes and of the family. Among the steppe peoples, however, as is revealed in their epic literatüre, in the travel account of Ibn Battuta and elsewhere, the women played a very important role by comparison with their Müslim counterparts. But at the time of the conversion of the Seljuks to islam, there appears to be a definite breakdown in traditional discipline among the Oghuz tribes. Could it be that the Seljuk leadership turned to islam to reinforce the waning loyalties of an obsolescent system of tribal discipline? Or perhaps, were the Turkic women either becoming too powerful or else less attractive to their men as they began to take as wives and concubines the more sophisticated and supplient Müslim women? ¥e do know, for example, that two out of the five rulers of the Kara Kitay (Western Liao) were women.
There is little doubt that the elite often accepted with circumspection the claims of the shamans. Is it to the decline in the influence of shamans, the loss of tribal discipline or the presence of other monotheistic faiths which helped to bring the Seljuks över to islam? There was doubtless a combination of factors, including the willingness of the proselytizing Sufi dervishes to accept many pre-Islamic practices.
ibrahim Kafesoğlu has taken note of an interesting accouııt of skepticism in high places vb en he telis of the encounter between a shaman and Ogatai, son and successor of Jenghiz Khan. 72 In the encounter, a Turkish speaking shaman claims to have talked wit]b. the deceased Temuchin and Ogatai, who was strongly under Christian influence, asked the shaman what language they spoke together. The shaman ccnfessed that he only knew Turkish. Thereupon, Ogatai held the shaman up to ridicule at court because his father only knew Mongol. Whatever the truth is behind the conversion of the Turks to islam, it is clear that they so construed islam that it served to reinforce the strict authority system of traditional steppe life, but islam also appears to have hurt the status of Turkish women. Moreover, a sheykh of a dervish order often set up his own system of authority which sometimes ran counter not only to Ottoman authority, for example, but to the tenents of islam.
5 . Ve have discussed at some length in this article the mechanisms which might account for the rather sudden change in the grazing patterns and life styles of the nomadic Turks, everts sufficient to impel the nomads into the agricultural heartlands of China or the Near East. In the case of the Western Oghuz, it is clear from their tribal legends that at the very time in the late lOth century when they were losing their inner cohesion, they were faced with very serious political pressure in Khwarezmia and Transoxiana. The path of least resistence apparently lay in the direction of the crumbling Samanid state. Here one might find pasture, booty, and employment as warriors. Clearly the chronicle of Baihaqi is the most valuable of ali for depictingthepoverty of the Seljuks as they first enter Khorasan. Also we gain from the same source a good indication of the keen intelligence of Tughril and Clıagri as they offer to Nishapur (1038 A. D.) Seljuk pıotection for which the notables were asked to pledge reasonable taxes. 73 One must, however, consider the question of original cause. Did the Seljuks indeed invade Khorasan or were they impelled to do so to ensure their survival against other encroaching political forces?
6 . As the Seljuks settled in I'ersia and Mesopotamia, it is interesting to see how quickly they come to terms with their new subjects, particularly the Persians, and then go about the business of ruling their farflung state with close relatives and a Persian bureaucracy. Similarly, the steppe nomads of inner Asia were ever adding new units of specialization to their confederations whether Chinese, skilled in irrigation or Tibetan infantrymen. They not infrequently used the Chinese or Uighurs for administrators. Well aware of new job opportunities, the Kuttab or bureaucratie class quickly floeked to the Seljuk banners when the Seljukid leadership showed itself wise and for the most part moderate. The Seljuks, possibly under Persian tutelage, were also quick to adopt the igta' 73 system to maintain the tranquility of the army witbout too heavy a drain on the scarce coinage of the empire. In like manner, the Ottomans also soon learned to make excellent use of the skills of their Christian and Jewish subjects.
7 . On the subject of special guard units surrounding the ruler, it is obvious that the practice had long been known to the Chinese and to the steppe nomads. It is probably true that an elitist steppe guard would not have received the sophisticated training which was accorded to pages in the Near East, a tranining so well depicted by Nizam al-Mulk in the SiyasetnarneJ
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The rigorous training described in the Siyasetname must have influenced the manner of training of palace guards in Ottoman times. As to the question of when did it occur to the Ottomans to draft their Christian subjects, this idea could not have been a new one either to the steppe or to islam in the fourteenth century. Historical literatüre dealing witlı the Liao (Kitay) and the Mongols often refer to the use of foreigners in the elite guard regiments long before the formation of the Ottoman state. Both Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna and Nizam al-Mulk, following the Ghazna example, believed in an ethnic mixture among the guards to ensure a competitive spirit and the safety of the sovereign.
Of particular interest, in the light of what happened to nomad rulers under the spell of Chinese civilization, is the observation of Nizam al-Mulk that the Türkmen (that is, the tribes) had already become an embarrassment to the dynasty in his day (late llth century) because the elan chieftains had reverted to earlier patterns of raiding and grazing at the expence of the peasantry. The solution of the Wazir called for the drafting of the sons of the elan leaders into the page service of the palace to ensure their loyalty and attaehment to the dynasty. 75 Such a proposal served a double purpose: to Iranize tbe young beys and to hold them as hostages (rehin) to ensure the loyalty of the fathers. China. One might also take as evidence of such enmity the murder of the Mongol envoys by the khwarezmshah just prior to the Mongol invasion of the Near East. As Kafesoğlu has aptly pointed out, did the Mongols bring so much destruction to a largely Turkish-ruled Near East out of love for the Turks ?
Osman Turan in his importan t study of Seljuk times has also emphasized once again the terrible destruction and wanton waste of human and economic resources which the Mongols brought to the Near East in the thirteenth century. In his opinion it is wrong for modern historians to underestimate this terrible disaster. 77 north. In the presence of such economic or social disparities, one must conclude that ethnic rivalry indeed existed. s
F. The Dynamics of Early Ottoman State Formation
In the preceding pages we have traced the origins and the development of Turkish political techniques in heir social context. Certain events and institutions have inevitably received emphasis at the expense of others, partly to illustrate a point of view and partly because of the strictures of space and time. In the final pages of this paper I should like to discuss, by means of a static model of Ottoman society, the dynamics of early Ottoman state formation. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had developed a social structure which may be outlined as follows: ...the Sultan is likened unto the perfectly skilled physician and the Reaya are likened unto the body and it is necessary for the physician (to know) how numerous are the maladiss of the body and what are their symptoms and their causes and even how many are their remedies. Likewise also it is necessary for the Sultan (to perceive) the state of health of the realm to ensure its remaining withiıı the limits of equilibrium and to know how it happens that the ailing members proceed from equilibrium to morbidity and from soundness to imbalance.... if disorder has taken place and morbidity has set in upon the body of the state, let (the Sultan) destroy and remove it....
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Generally speaking, however, a newly forming state must initially ally itself with 'Elements of Instability' in order to undermine the previously established order. A brief glance at our ten theoretical divisions of IslamicOttoman society will suffice to separate and to juxtapose 'Elements of Instability' to 'Elements of Stability': 5. certain unspecified tribes 6. specially favored non-Muslims, many of whom became converts to islam 7. certain of the dervish orders.
If we look at these disparate elements objectively, we realize that the principal 'Element of Stability' is the Ottoman family itself. But clearly, in the turbulent times of the late thirteenth century, a strong family was not a large enough social unit to attract the attention or the patronage, for example, of the figurehead Rum Seljuk Sultaus even for such an appointment as that of a march lord (uc beyi), a position, Orhan was in possession of when Rum was visited by Ibn Battuta. Nor could a mere family command the allegiance of the turbulent condottieri and their gazis unless that family were quite wealthy. Following this üne of reasoning, one must conclude that the Osmanli were members of or closely allied with a majör social element of thirteenth century Asia Minör. That element, in spite of a number claims to the contrary, was probably a Turkish tribe. The sparse evidence at hand points in that direction. It is inconceivable to imagine that the powerful leaders of the gazis at the time of the formation of the Ottoman state would submit to the control of the Osmanli unless most to the coustituent members of the gazi units were of tribal origin and also felt a special attachment to the Osmanli as the leading family of their tribe or tribal confederation. Moreover, it seems apparent that the original Osmanli were quite ohummy with the Ahi (Akhi) craft guilds, the dervish orders and later on, the followers of Sheykh Safa of Erdebil. These tendencies lead us to three further conjectures: that the Osmanli probably came, not with the first wave of Turks in the eleventh century, but with the second wave in the thirteenth: that the Osmanli may have come to Asia Minör from Azerbaijan; and that, given the Shi'ite bias of the Ilkhans, the Osmanli were in a better position to receive support for their state-buüding from the Ilkhans than older and better-entrenched 'Elements of Stability' in the Rum Seljuk realm. With both tribal (their own) and official Ilkhan support, the Osmanli would then be in a strong position to control the condottieri of the gazis and to expand at the expease of strong neighbors such as Byzantium, the Bey of Kastamonu, the Germiyan Oğulları and others.
The early Ottoman chroniclers provide contrasting versions of early events in Ottoman history. Yazıcıoğlu Ali, following Ibn Bibi, associates the Ottomans with the Kayi tribe on whom supposedly devolved the heritage of Oghuz leadership. 83 Aşikpaşazade gave importance to the right of conquest.
He felt that the God-appointed con,queror should receive the unquestioned obedience of the people. Finally, Neşri, writing in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, indicated that the sovereignty of the Seljuks passed to the Osmanli because Alaeddin Kaykobad bin Feramuz, the Rum Seljuk ruler, had no offspring and hence favored Osman as his successor. Whether or not one accepts the Kayı provenience of the Osmanli, and much energy has been expended pro and con on the subject, 85 the Yazıcıoğlu version has the advantage of age and also fits best the results of the preceding political analysis. If we accept the Osmanli as leaders of a tribal confederation of the type known to us in Central Asia, then ali of the "Elements of Instability" with whieh the Ottomans worked initially to form a state are exactly those elements out of which new states were so frequently formed on the periphery of the steppe. Only after the Osmanlı withstood tremendous pressures for dissolution-Gazi revolts, Dervish-led disorders, family squabbles, external threats-only then could the Osmanlı generate enough momentum to acquire wealth through territorial expansion, an increase in population, and the collection of booty and taxes. Only then could the Osmanlı begin to attract and to pay the traditionally stable units of the Islamic polity: the bureaucracy, the 'Ulema, a Mamluk guard, and a 'service gentry.' Indeed, the transformation which took place in the O ttoman state between the mid-fourteenth and the mid-fifteenth centuries entailed chiefly the transferal of power from 'Elements of Instability' to these v;ry 'Elements of Stability.' The grandchildren of the 'hungry and daring nomad' now sat in the seat of power. 1243, the Rum Seljuk Sultans colleeted the taxes from their dominion and satellites for the Mongols and with the aid of their detaclıments. Could it be that, as the respect for and the prestige of the Seljuk Sultans waned in the late thirteenth century, the Mongols appointed as uc beyleri those leaders of Turkish elans who would cooperate with the Ilkhans to the extent of having tacit or aetive Mongol support for the accretions of territory in the marehes in exchange for the payment of a t ix or pericik ? irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr appears to share this suspieion and .has discovered the important observation of Shihab ed-Din al'Umari who lived in the early part of the fourteenth century: "Alors chacun de ces Turcs s'attacha â capter la bienveillance des souveins mongols, afin de s'assurer la possession des etats qu'ils avaient usurpes...."
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The quest for the 'Origins and Nature of Turkish Power' is at an end. It has taken us from the borders of China to the shores of the Bosphorus, a most fitting and exciting journey to take on the 900th anniversary of the victory of Manzikert. To this writer, it is a good omen that once again in this very year diplomatic relations have once again opened between these two ancient neighbors, the Chinese and the Turks. POSTSCRIPT I had abruptly ended my own speculations on the origins of the Osmanli, not because ali had been said or reviewed, but because of the exigencies of time and space. Since writing the i'oregoing remarks, I have had the opportunity to read the brilliant contributions to the subject by Professors Halil Inalcik and Osman Turan in the Cambridge History of islam I (Cambridge, 1970) . In particular, one must give careful attention to what Turan has said about the distinetion between the large iqta' given to leading emirs by the Great Seljuks and the modest tracts of timar placed at the disposal of warriors in Anatolia by the Rum Seljuks. 87 Likewise we are indebted to Inalcik's ca- 
